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Evidence and Religious Belief is a collection of essays organized around 
epistemological topics within the philosophy of religion. The volume 
takes up three central questions concerning evidence and religious 
belief: first, whether religious belief requires evidence to be rational; 
second, the role desires and attitudes play in affecting what evidence we 
have or by influencing our assessment of the evidence; and, third, what 
evidence there is for and against particular religious beliefs. The volume 
is loosely focused on the work of George mavrodes. The editors dedicate 
this volume to mavrodes and five of the eleven essays discuss aspects of 
mavrodes’s philosophy, with mavrodes’s book Belief in God: A Study in 
the Epistemology of Religion (1970) getting special attention.
This volume has much to offer for those interested in the philosophy 
of religion. All of the essays succeed in advancing the discussion on their 
specific issue. For example, Chris Tucker’s essay is a  solid treatment of 
how a  phenomenal conservative should understand the demand for 
evidentially based beliefs within the philosophy of religion. e.J. Coffman 
and Jeff Cervantez’s contribution is a careful assessment of Paul moser’s 
recent reply to the hiddenness argument. William Hasker’s essay, 
accompanied by a  short response by John Hick, is a  valuable addition 
to the literature on Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis. Thomas Crisp’s essay 
attempts to undermine a  central claim in the atheistic argument from 
evil by means of a  novel application of Alvin Plantinga’s evolutionary 
argument against naturalism. The reader of this volume will come away 
with a better understanding of current issues in the philosophy of religion.
Instead of the reviewer’s customary practice of summarizing and 
briefly commenting on each essay, I  want to highlight two important 
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contributions both of which, in their own ways, aim to undermine the 
enlightenment ideal of reason that each individual person is a  pure 
and autonomous epistemic agent. A pure epistemic agent is one whose 
doxastic states are not influenced by affective states. This is the subject 
of Wainwright’s excellent contribution. An autonomous epistemic agent 
is one whose doxastic states are properly governed only by one’s own 
evaluation of the evidence. This is the issue in the background of both 
Zagzebski’s and Kelly’s articles on the argument from common consent, 
also known as the consensus gentium.
I begin with Zagzebski’s and Kelly’s superb articles on the argument 
from common consent. even though this argument has a  venerable 
history, having been defended by Plato, Cicero, Seneca, Calvin, and 
others (see Kelly, p. 136 for a brief list of defenders), it has fallen out of 
favour. It’s remarkable, therefore, that two of the essays in this volume, 
independently, argue that the consensus gentium has more merits than its 
recent fall from grace suggests.
linda Zagzebski’s article ‘epistemic Self-Trust and the Consensus 
Gentium Argument’, explores the reasonableness of religious belief as 
a  consequence of the reasonableness of self-trust. She argues that our 
natural desire for truth makes it reasonable to trust ourselves and that this 
trust must be extended to other people as well. unless we have specific 
reasons to find people unworthy of trust, self-trust requires us to regard 
their beliefs favourably. This opens the door for a  common consent 
argument. If a vast majority of people each independently believes that 
there is a divine being, then self-trust commits us to regarding this belief 
as having a presumption of truth.
Zagzebski explicitly distinguishes her ‘self-trust’ version of the 
common consent argument from the ordinary presentation of the 
argument as an inference to the best explanation (see p. 34). Zagzebski’s 
argument ‘links trust in the beliefs of others with self-trust’ (p. 34). As 
she underscores, our self-trust commits ‘granting prima facie credibility 
to the belief of another’ (p. 34). As we’ll see in a moment with Kelly’s 
argument, on Zagzebski’s interpretation of the argument convergence 
isn’t so much a datum to be explained; rather the idea is that the fact 
that many people converge in opinion increases the plausibility of the 
claim because self-trust commits you to regarding the opinions of others 
favourably. As convergence increases, the demands arising from self-
trust require that the claim’s plausibility increase, assuming the absence 
of defeaters.
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In ‘Consensus Gentium: reflections on the “common consent” argu-
ment for the existence of God’, Kelly argues that, in general, the fact that 
a majority of people each independently believes a claim gives the claim 
a presumption of truth. Kelly contends that if a large number of people 
performing some non-trivial mathematical calculation each converge on 
an answer, then the fact that they converge makes it plausible that the 
convergence answer is the correct answer. Similarly, if a large group of 
people each independently attests that a  large crocodile was in Times 
Square, then the best explanation of this remarkable convergence is that 
there really was a crocodile in New York City.
An interesting twist in Kelly’s presentation is to consider the 
evidential value of common consent arguments in cases in which the 
truth of the matter cannot be discerned directly, but individuals must 
rely on evidence to form their opinion (see pp. 139-143). What is the 
evidential value of convergence in a case like this? What is the evidential 
value of convergence in a case like this when one has access to the original 
evidence itself? Kelly quotes John Stuart mill as being of the opinion that 
when one has the first-hand evidence, the fact of convergence is of little 
value. If mill is right then one should give little weight to how other 
people have responded to the evidence. What is crucial, in mill’s view, is 
how you respond to the first-hand evidence. but Kelly argues that other 
people’s reactions to the evidence ‘bears on the accuracy of one’s own 
assessment of the (original, first hand) evidence’ (p. 140). Consequently, 
even in cases in which one knows the evidence that a person has for their 
view, their treatment of that evidence is itself evidentially significant to 
your own evaluation.
The two most powerful objections to the consensus gentium are, first, 
that the convergence on theistic opinion is not independent and, second, 
that there is ubiquitous disagreement in theological opinion so that 
there’s very little sense to be made of convergence. Neither Zagzebski 
nor Kelly engage in sustained polemics against these objections. rather, 
both focus on more general epistemological issues surrounding the 
objections. For instance, both Kelly and Zagzebski argue that while the 
failure of independence can constitute an objection to the argument, 
the widespread persistence of theistic belief requires explanation. even 
if theistic belief were passed along generationally, it is still remarkable 
that it persists. Zagzebski’s construal of the persistence of belief is subtly 
different from Kelly’s discussion. For Kelly, persistence is a  datum 
to be explained. For Zagzebksi, persistence may be a  reliable sign of 
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conscientiousness. ultimately, from Zagzebski’s self-trust perspective, 
the independence of convergence is not so important as is the underlying 
assiduousness of the individual’s intellectual life.
on the subject of disagreement, Zagzebski is the most upfront 
about her response. She claims that ‘the idea of God common among 
all peoples is exceedingly vague’ (p. 35), but that it amounts to a ‘half-
glimpse’. According to Zagzebski, this glimmer may still be evidentially 
significant, especially as providing evidence against naturalism. Kelly’s 
response to this objection goes through the issue of how the word ‘God’ 
functions. If it functions as a proper name, then it’s possible that many 
people manage to refer to a divine being even in the face of significant 
theological controversy. If, however, it functions as a description, then 
widespread theological disagreement may undermine significant 
agreement on whether or not there is a God.
An interesting and common theme in both Zagzebski’s and Kelly’s 
essays is the evidential value of other people’s opinion when it conflicts 
with your opinion. In recent years, the epistemology literature has 
focused on the evidential significance of peer disagreement. When you 
discover that an equally competent, conscientious, and informed friend 
disagrees with you about a particular matter, how should your present 
opinion change? The issue in the common consent argument is slightly 
different: when you discover that a  majority of apparently assiduous 
people in a variety of different circumstances independently converges 
on an opinion, how does that affect the evidence for the claim that is 
converged upon? both Zagzebski and Kelly put on the table engaging 
proposals about how to take into account majority opinion.
I turn now to William Wainwright’s rich essay, ‘Theistic Proofs, Person 
relativity, and the rationality of religious belief ’. Wainwright focuses his 
attention on the agnostic objection to religious belief that ‘agnosticism 
is more admirable than the faith of a  Christian whose strength of 
conviction exceeds what the evidence warrants’ (p. 77). His ultimate goal 
in this essay is to explore the conception of reason that undergirds this 
objection and to destabilize the strength of that conception of reason.
Wainwright begins his essay with a discussion of the various purposes 
of theistic proofs and a  general discussion of what constitutes a  good 
argument. After pointing out that theistic arguments have been used 
for a  number of different aims (strengthening believers, engaging the 
unconvinced, an offering to God, etc.), Wainwright turns his attention 
to what, in general, makes for a  good argument. He observes that 
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both Plantinga and Swinburne operate with a conception of argument 
according to which a good argument is one that is valid and proceeds 
from premises ‘nearly every sane man’ accepts. Plantinga and Swinburne’s 
conception of a good argument requires that a good argument is formally 
valid and proceeds from some stock of universally known claims. The 
difficulty with this conception of a  good argument is that it doesn’t 
account for the strength of an argument when only a  limited number 
of people know the premises of the argument. Gödel’s incompleteness 
proof is a perfectly good argument, even though very few people actually 
understand it. While universality is a desideratum of a good argument, 
the most significant feature of a  good argument is its strength. Good 
or compelling arguments extend knowledge when the premises are 
themselves known. Wainwright suggests, therefore, that some arguments 
may be strong or compelling even though not everyone who understands 
the premises of the argument will accept the conclusion. This may arise 
when a person who understands the claims in the argument does not 
know them to be true. In this connection, Wainwright says that a good 
argument can be person-relative.
In the next section, Wainwright extends the person-relativity of 
proofs in new, intriguing directions. He attempts to account for some 
of the finer aspects of the person-relativity of proofs. Some unsurprising 
aspects of person-relativity arise because of individual differences in 
education, intelligence, or, broadly, location. one individual finds a proof 
compelling while another does not because the first has the requisite 
intellectual skill to appreciate the force of the reasoning.
other kinds of person-relativity, though, are more delicate. 
Wainwright argued in the first section that a good argument is valid, non-
circular and succeeds in the purpose for which it was offered. Thus, one 
way an argument can fail to be compelling is when a person doesn’t share 
the same purposes as the one who offers the argument. Wainwright avers 
that even if an argument is valid and noncircular, if a person fails to have 
the purposes of the arguer it can be simply dismissed as an intellectual 
curiosity. Consequently, a  significant aspect of the person-relativity of 
a good argument is the interest required to take the argument seriously. 
The failure of an argument to achieve universal assent may reflect the 
fact that people do not have common interests.
Another significant aspect concerning the person-relativity of 
arguments lies in the connection deductive and strict inductive 
arguments have to cumulative case arguments or explanatory arguments. 
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even if one possesses a valid, non-circular argument for an interesting 
conclusion, one may dismiss the argument on the grounds that its 
premises or its assumptions do not fit into the best explanatory system. 
Yet, one’s judgment about the explanatory goodness of a hypothesis is 
invariably affected by one’s personal history and one’s value judgments. 
To take a  simple example, one’s assessment of the weight of evidence 
for a hypothesis depends on what the alternative hypotheses are as well 
as the intrinsic plausibility one gives to the alternatives. but there is no 
mechanical procedure for either determining what the alternatives are 
or how they should be weighted. often this is done on the basis of the 
value one deems the alternative hypotheses to realize. Wainwright takes 
this conclusion a step further: in assessments of existentially significant 
or value-laden hypotheses, one’s passional nature plays a major role in 
determining the overall plausibility of the hypothesis.
These themes come to a  head in Wainwright’s final section on 
Schellenberg’s objection. Schellenberg objects that religious faith sins 
against reason by having confidence that is unsupported by the evidence. 
A  crucial assumption in Schellenberg’s argument is that the evidence 
for and against theism should be described without any substantive 
metaphysical commitments. That is, the relevant evidence should be 
neutral. Wainwright objects to this assumption. He begins by pointing 
out that neutrality and fair-mindedness are distinct. A  fair-minded 
inquirer seeks evidentially based beliefs, is open to criticism, and seeks 
to revise her beliefs in light of the evidence generated by open dialogue. 
Fair-mindedness doesn’t imply neutrality, though. A  fair-minded 
person can bring to the table any number of commitments that affect 
her assessment of the explanatory theories on offer. even though she 
has these commitments and so doesn’t realize ‘neutrality’, she doesn’t sin 
against reason because neutrality isn’t a requirement of reason.
Wainwright doesn’t make explicit the argument that neutrality isn’t 
a requirement of reason, but I think the argument comes from reflecting 
on cases. In the areas of morality and aesthetics, the enlightenment ideal 
of neutrality is problematic. If one were to describe the aesthetically 
neutral properties of an o’Keeffe desert landscape in virtue of which it is 
art, one may be hard pressed to resist agnosticism. In a case like this one’s 
passional nature may be the enabler that allows one to rightly appreciate 
the beauty of an o’Keeffe landscape. Similarly, as Plato has argued, proper 
affections may be required to reason rightly about moral matters. If reason 
requires neutrality then reason may foreclose possibilities to truth. In 
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light of the distinction between fair-mindedness and neutrality, it seems 
more reasonable to leave open more possibilities. but, as Wainwright 
observes, one’s attitudes to opening or foreclosing possibilities may be 
influenced by how one weighs the different injunctions to believe the 
truth or to shun error (p. 91).
I hope to have conveyed some of richness of Wainwright’s discussion. 
Wainwright articulates a  view of reason according to which reason 
allows for more possibilities than the agnostic professes. one ongoing 
concern about the proliferation of possibilities – letting a  thousand 
flowers bloom – is the difficulty of comparative judgments of plausibility. 
If Wainwright’s view is correct then it seems to imply that reason is 
unable to significantly compare the plausibility of competing hypotheses 
in a non-question begging fashion. Yet, it may be that reason does not 
demand paying the cost of foreclosing possibilities.
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randal rauser’s Theology in Search of Foundation (ouP 2009, 
henceforth TSF) is the latest addition to the philosophical literature on 
the epistemology of theology. In recent years, there has been more and 
more talk about something called analytic theology. It is not perfectly 
clear what analytic theology is, but it seems appropriate to understand 
it as a movement in philosophical theology and philosophy of religion, 
which encourages and supports the use of analytic philosophical tools 
to treat questions that have traditionally been understood as theological 
rather than philosophical (e.g., Trinity, Christology, Incarnation, etc.). 
Furthermore, analytic theology, it seems, attempts to be a  reforming 
movement of theological method – an attempt to free theology from its 
‘‘continental captivity’’. As philosophers of religion go, most of the issues 
that TSF discusses are somewhat familiar, whereas for contemporary 
theologians, the topics might seem rather weird. If rauser’s approach 
to theology seems perplexing, the reader should consult michael rea’s 
opening essay to a recent edited volume Analytic Theology: New Essays 
in the Philosophy of Theology (2009).
